PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENA


While it doesn’t seem hard to identity contemporary “phenomenology” with respect to its main figures (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc.) and key concepts (intentionality, living body, world etc.) it is still unclear if and to what extent such authors and concepts are all related to a common, distinctive concept of “phenomenon”. In other words, what does the “phenomenon” mean within the compound word “phenomeno-logy”? Does contemporary phenomenology rest on several different concepts of phenomenon? And if this is the case, and how are they related? Does such plurality imply that the heading “phenomenology” is just an equivocal term? By comparing and contrasting different concepts of “phenomenon” spelled out by authors such as Brentano, Husserl, Reinach, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, M. Henry and many others, in this seminar we will go as far as to question the unity and apparent coherence of the so-called “phenomenological tradition”